全部文献期刊学位论文会议报纸专利标准年鉴图书|学者科研项目
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作者:Kjell Erik Lommerud , Odd Rune Straume , Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, Vol.116, pp.540-554Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)Consider a model with two types of jobs. The profitability of hiring a worker to a fast-track job depends not only on his or her observable talent, but also on incontractible effort. We investigate whether self-fulfilling expectations may lead to higher hiring or pro...
作者:Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen , Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].Information Economics and Policy, 2003, Vol.15 (3), pp.384-401Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)It is well known that switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. With heterogeneous consumers and incomplete information...
作者:Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006, Vol.25 (3), pp.597-614Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values, but where the auction designer can release information so that the bidders learn their values before entry. Such early information will induce screening of high...
作者:Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].Journal of Public Economics, 1995, Vol.58 (2), pp.283-307Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)If a government cares for local firms' profit, but not for foreign firms', foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts. Foreign firms will be chosen less often and, when chosen, earn less profit than local firms. We...
作者:Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000, Vol.18 (6), pp.949-963Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)Should the government procure equipment for its agencies or let them run their own procurement auctions? Suppose the agency has private information about product quality, but is inclined to favour local suppliers. Decentralization saves bureaucracy and “agency c...
作者:Egil Kjerstad , Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000, Vol.18 (8), pp.1243-1257Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment bef...
作者:Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen , Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].European Economic Review, 2007, Vol.52 (1), pp.99-115Elsevier
摘要:Abstract(#br)Mobile telephony networks typically overcharge each other for the termination of incoming calls, leading to high prices for off-net traffic. The existing theory claims that this behavior reduces profits since high termination charges make firms set high marginal pric...
作者:Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].Journal of Population Economics, 2001, Vol.14 (2), pp.301-312Springer
摘要:Abstract.(#br) In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperativ...
作者:Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen , Steinar Vagstad
来源:[J].Review of Economic Design, 2004, Vol.9 (1), pp.59-71Springer
摘要:Abstract.(#br)Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly ...

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