全部文献期刊会议图书|学者科研项目
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作者:Stephen D. Williamson
来源:[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2018, Vol.89, pp.154-172
摘要:Abstract(#br)The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) suggests, in its extreme form, that the fiscal authority always constrains central bank behavior. A Fisherian model is used to show that fiscal policy can be irrelevant for the central bank, and that a central bank can...
作者:Helder Ferreira de Mendonça , Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay
来源:[J].Journal of Policy Modeling, 2016
摘要:... The novelty concerns the investigation of the effect of the communication and clarity of the fiscal authority on market expectations on public debt. The article addresses empirical evidence, based on the Brazilian experience, regarding the idea that communication is essential...
作者:Gaurango Banerjee
来源:[J].Journal of Economics and Business, 2001, Vol.53 (1), pp.45-68
摘要:Abstract(#br)This paper evaluates the implications of international policy coordination under the setting of a common monetary authority and separate fiscal authorities. The paper considers a two-country framework with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies. The deviations o...
作者:Woroniecka-Leciejewicz
来源:[J].Journal of Organisational Transformation & Social Change, 2010, Vol.7 (2), pp.189-210
摘要:Abstract(#br)This article presents an analysis of the states of equilibrium and Pareto optimality of the solutions in the monetary-fiscal games between the fiscal and monetary authorities each having either two or three qualitatively different strategies: expansive, neutral and r...
作者:HISASHI SAWAKI
来源:[J].Japanese Economic Review, 2010, Vol.61 (2), pp.202-217
摘要:This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period ...
作者:Andrew Hughes Hallett , Christos Mavrodimitrakis
来源:[J].Journal of Macroeconomics, 2018
摘要:Abstract(#br)This paper utilises a steady state (equilibrium) representation of a reduced-form Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to deal with strategic fiscal/monetary policy interactions in a core-periphery monetary union, in which the periphery member's fiscal authority...
作者:Pompeo Posta , Valeria Bonis
来源:[J].Open Economies Review, 2009, Vol.20 (2), pp.241-263
摘要:Abstract(#br)In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994 ) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming tha...
作者:MONTSERRAT FERRÉ
来源:[J].JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2005, Vol.43 (3), pp.539-550
摘要:Abstract(#br)The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aims at reducing the deficit bias and inducing fiscal policy co‐ordination in EMU. This article shows that, under positive (demand or supply) shocks, average deficits and interest rates with fiscal co‐ordination can be hig...
作者:Anke S. Kessler
来源:[J].Journal of Political Economy, 2014, Vol.122 (4), pp.766-805
摘要:... Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted patte...
作者:Donatella Gatti , Christa van Wijnbergen
来源:[J].Oxford Economic Papers, 2002, Vol.54 (1), pp.56-71
摘要:This paper examines the conditions for fiscal restraint to emerge as Nash equilibrium in the game between fiscal authorities in a monetary union and discusses the implications for the ECB's monetary strategy. We show that fiscal authorities fail to internalize the adverse area-wi...

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