美国经济学会
期刊
会议
图书
作者:Fernando Luco
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.26-54美国经济学会
摘要:How do different switching costs affect choices and competition in a private pension system? I answer this question in a setting in which variation in employment status allows me to identify two switching costs that jointly affect enrollees’ decisions: the cost of evaluating...
作者:Daniel Barron , Michael Powell
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.228-249美国经济学会
摘要:We consider how a firm’s policies constrain its relational contracts. A policy is a sequence of decisions made by a principal; each decision determines how agents’ efforts affect their outputs. We consider surplus-maximizing policies in a flexible dynamic moral hazard proble...
作者:Ran Spiegler
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.173-194美国经济学会
摘要:Behavioral economics is widely perceived to be part of the profession’s shift away from a culture that places abstract theory at its center. I present a critical discussion of the atheoretical style with which “behavioral” themes are often disseminated: a purely anecdot...
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.i-vi美国经济学会
作者:Fernando Luco
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.277-305美国经济学会
摘要:How does online price disclosure affect competition when both consumers and firms can use the disclosed information? This paper addresses this question exploiting the sequential implementation of an online price-disclosure policy in the Chilean retail gasoline industry. The resul...
作者:Andrea Attar , Catherine Casamatta , Arnold Chassagnon ...
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.98-130美国经济学会
摘要:We study capital markets in which investors compete by designing financial contracts to control an entrepreneur’s ability to side trade and default on multiple loans. We show that covenants may have anticompetitive effects: in particular, they prevent investors from providin...
作者:Silvana Krasteva , Huseyin Yildirim
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.131-172美国经济学会
摘要:Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which sequence? In this paper, we show that an informed buyer would start with the high-value seller to minimize future holdup. Informed (or careful) ...
作者:Cheng Chen , Wing Suen
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.1-25美国经济学会
摘要:Several classes of models of hierarchical organizations share two common properties: the characteristics at different levels of the hierarchy are complementary, but this complementarity does not extend beyond adjacent levels. We propose a unified yet simple approach to study comp...
作者:Maria Bigoni , Gabriele Camera , Marco Casari
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.195-227美国经济学会
摘要:We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretical...
作者:John Kennes , Daniel Monte , Norovsambuu Tumennasan
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (2), pp.55-97美国经济学会
摘要:In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism....

我们正在为您处理中,这可能需要一些时间,请稍等。

资源合作:cnki.scholar@cnki.net, +86-10-82896619   意见反馈:scholar@cnki.net

×