美国经济学会
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作者:Kiryl Khalmetski , Dirk Sliwka
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.79-110美国经济学会
摘要:We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential report...
作者:Matthias Fahn , Nicolas Klein
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.33-58美国经济学会
摘要:We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To ...
作者:Guido Friebel , Michael Kosfeld , Gerd Thielmann
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.59-78美国经济学会
摘要:We conduct experimental games with police applicants in Germany to investigate whether intrinsically motivated agents self-select into this type of public service. Our focus is on trustworthiness and the willingness to enforce norms of cooperation as key dimensions of intrinsic m...
作者:Drew Fudenberg , Emanuel Vespa
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.186-215美国经济学会
摘要:We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned...
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.i-vi美国经济学会
作者:Ina Taneva
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.151-185美国经济学会
摘要:A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information...
作者:Thomas N. Hubbard , Michael J. Mazzeo
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.216-249美国经济学会
摘要:Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton’s (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investiga...
作者:Daniel Bird , Alexander Frug
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.111-150美国经济学会
摘要:We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, co...
作者:Matthias Fahn , Hendrik Hakenes
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.1-32美国经济学会
摘要:We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual’...
来源:[J].American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, Vol.11 (4), pp.i-vi美国经济学会

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